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Abstract
A recent literature shows how an increase in volatility reduces leverage.
However, in order to explain pro-cyclical leverage it assumes that bad news
increases volatility, that is, it assumes an inverse relationship between ﬁrst
and second moments of asset returns. This paper suggests a reason why bad
news is more often than not associated with higher future volatility. We show
that, in a model with endogenous leverage and heterogeneous beliefs, agents
have the incentive to invest mostly in technologies that become more volatile
in bad times. Agents choose these technologies because they can be leveraged
more during normal times. Together with the existing literature this explains
pro-cyclical leverage. The result also gives a rationale to the pattern of volatil-
ity smiles observed in stock options since 1987. Finally, the paper presents
for the ﬁrst time a dynamic model in which an asset is endogenously traded
simultaneously at diﬀerent margin requirements in equilibrium.
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11 Introduction
After the recent ﬁnancial crisis there is almost universal agreement that leverage is
pro-cyclical: leverage is high during normal times and low during anxious or crisis
times. Figures 1 and 2, taken from Geanakoplos [19 − 20], display leverage and asset
prices for the housing market and for AAA securities from 1998-2009. They both
show that leverage is pro-cyclical: prices rise as leverage increases, and prices fall
as leverage decreases. In particular, both leverage and prices collapsed during the
recent ﬁnancial crisis. This has also been documented by Adrian and Shin [2] and
Gorton and Metrick [22].
Figure 1: Pro-cyclical leverage: housing.
A recent theoretical literature has gone quite far in explaining how leverage is in-
ﬂuenced by volatility in equilibrium, and why there is a positive relationship between
leverage and asset prices. For example, Geanakoplos [17 − 19] shows how supply and
demand determine equilibrium leverage and why higher tail volatility reduces lever-
age. In his model higher leverage increases asset prices. He suggested (in [18]) that
big crises occur when bad news is of a particular kind he called “scary bad news”,
2Figure 2: Pro-cyclical leverage: AAA securities.
because the news raises tail volatility, as well as decreasing expectations, and hence
reduces leverage. Prices then decline not only because of the lower expectations, but
also because of the lower leverage.1 A similar story has been told in Brunnermeier
and Pedersen [7]. Geanakoplos has called this ampliﬁcation mechanism the Leverage
Cycle.2 Fostel and Geanakoplos [13] extended it further to many assets and adverse
selection.
The leverage cycle mechanism essentially assumes that bad news is associated
with high volatility, so that there is an inverse relationship between ﬁrst moments
(expected future payoﬀs ) and second moments (volatility of payoﬀ). This assump-
tion that bad news, at least very bad news, is associated with very high volatility
seems quite plausible. Figure 3 shows the history of the VIX index (the Chicago
Board Options Exchange Volatility Index) a popular measure of the implied volatil-
ity of SP 500 index options. A high value corresponds to a more volatile market and
1Prices also decline because the optimists, who leverage up in the ebullient phase of the cycle,
go disproportionately bankrupt when bad news comes and prices start to fall.
2As opposed to credit cycles from the more classical literature in Macroeconomics (such as Kiy-
otaki and Moore [27] and Bernanke and Gertler [5], which refers to the feedback and co-movement
between borrowing and prices, ignoring changes in their ratio, that is, ignoring changes in leverage.
3therefore more costly options. Often referred to as the fear index, it represents one
measure of the market’s expectation of volatility over the next 30 day period. We
clearly see that the index was very high during the recent ﬁnancial crisis implying
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Figure 3: VIX index.
Without a theory that explains why bad news induces high volatility we are only
half way in explaining the pro-cyclical pattern of leverage observed in the data. The
main contribution of this paper is to shed light on this missing link and hence to
more fully understand the relationship between news, volatility and leverage. We
show that in a model with endogenous leverage and heterogeneous beliefs, agents
have the incentive to invest mostly in technologies that become more volatile in bad
times. Agents choose these technologies because they can be leveraged more during
normal times. In this sense, the paper “closes” the leverage cycle models.
More precisely, we consider a family of three-period projects (assets), all with
exactly the same probabilities of ultimate success or failure in the last period. In
the middle period good or bad news arrives which alters the probabilities of ultimate
success or failure for the projects. For some projects bad news comes associated
4with an increase in future payoﬀ volatility, so ﬁrst and second moments are inversely
correlated. We call these the “Post-Bad News Volatile projects” (from now on BV).
Extreme BV are projects in which uncertainty is completely resolved after good
news, so all future uncertainty comes after bad news. In other projects good news
induces higher future payoﬀ volatility. We will call these the “Post-Good News
Volatile projects” (from now on GV). Extreme GV are projects in which uncertainty
is completely resolved after bad news, so all future uncertainty comes after good
news.
In our model agents have heterogeneous beliefs and can use these projects or
assets as collateral to borrow money. Leverage is endogenously determined in equi-
librium. Agents are presented with a menu of one-period non-contingent promises,
each collateralized by one unit of asset (or project) and leverage becomes endogenous
since in equilibrium not all promises are actively traded.
Which projects will be chosen to be produced in equilibrium, and therefore what
are the equilibrium ﬂuctuations in volatility and leverage and asset prices as good
news or bad news arrives? The main results are the following.
When we study economies endowed with only one project we prove that: i) the
initial prices of all the extreme GV projects are the same, and lower than all other
projects, ii) the highest initial priced project is always an extreme BV project, iii)
initial leverage is higher in extreme BV projects than in extreme GV projects and
iv) leverage is pro-cyclical in extreme BV projects and counter-cyclical in all the
others.
Why do the projects have such diﬀerent prices and leverage characteristics in
equilibrium despite their identical ﬁnal payoﬀ distribution? The key is the eﬀect of
news on leverage.
We prove that in binary trees leverage is endogenously given by the VaR=0 rule,
i.e., the maximum that agents can promise is the worst case scenario in the immediate
future: the price of the project after bad news. In extreme BV projects the price
does not fall much after bad news precisely because bad news is little informative. By
contrast, bad news in extreme GV projects is very informative, drastically lowering
the price. Thus extreme BV projects are more valuable than extreme GV projects
at the beginning because they can be leveraged more. A higher borrowing capacity
implies that all of the asset in the economy can be bought by fewer investors. Since
5there is a continuum of buyers with continuously decreasing valuations, the marginal
buyer then has a more optimistic asset valuation. This raises the project’s price.
Finally, an implication of the V a R=0rule is that all projects other than extreme
BV projects exhibit counter-cyclical leverage in equilibrium. Every project is worth
the most after good news but as long as every agent still thinks ultimate failure is
still possible, the same minimum promise will be the only traded promise. Hence the
ratio of promise to collateral will be least just when the price of the asset is highest.
Only in extreme BV projects, where there is no chance of ultimate failure after good
news, will leverage be pro-cyclical.
Our results suggest that agents have an incentive to build BV projects rather than
GV projects because they are worth more at the moment of construction. Financial
ﬁrms and banks similarly have an incentive to commit to accounting schemes in which
bad news comes out slowly, because that will enable them to leverage more at the
beginning. It is worth remembering that the subprime crisis of 2007-2009 developed
very slowly over two and a half years. Announcements about bank losses dribbled out
a few billion dollars at a time. Over the ﬁrst year and a half most pundits maintained
that the crisis would turn out to be minor, even though mortgage security prices and
housing prices were steadily declining. It is interesting that when we extend our
model to N periods, the gap in initial price between extreme BV and extreme GV
projects gets bigger and bigger as N grows and as the amount of information released
per period shrinks.
In the last Section of the paper we augment the model by allowing each of the
continuum of agents to use one unit of labor to produce one unit of either an extreme
BV project or extreme GV project. It turns out there is a scarcity value of producing
the project others do not, so in equilibrium both projects are produced. Moreover,
since we assume good or bad news about each project arrives independently, the tree
is no longer binary. We show that our theorem (for binary trees) that there is no
default in equilibrium no longer holds. Even more interesting, diﬀerent agents will
leverage the same project diﬀerently.
Nonetheless, our main results remain intact. We compute equilibrium explicitly
for a ﬁxed class of utilities and show that no matter what the production parameters,
over 70% of the assets produced are extreme BV. Moreover, though each project is
leveraged diﬀerently by diﬀerent people, the average leverage of the extreme BV
project is higher than the extreme GV project and leverage is pro-cyclical in the BV
project and counter-cyclical in the GV project.
6Thus most of the time when we observe bad news about a project we will observe
high volatility and low leverage, explaining the leverage cycle stylized facts above.
This result also suggests an explanation for the observed “Volatility Smile” in stock
options. This refers to the fact that implied volatility has a negative relationship
with the strike price, so volatility decreases as the strike price increases. Hence,
bad news comes (or are assumed to come) with high volatility. This pattern has
existed for the majority of equities only after the stock market crash of 1987. This
has led some economist like Bates [4] and Rubinstein [28] to explain volatilities
smiles by “crashophobia”. Traders were concerned about the possibility of another
crash and they priced options accordingly. Our result provides a completely diﬀerent
explanation. Our agents are perfectly rational; they endogenously choose projects
associated with volatile bad news since they can leverage more with them.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature.
Section 3 presents the general model of endogenous leverage. Section 4 characterizes
the equilibrium properties of asset prices and leverage in each project considered as a
separate economy. Section 5 extends the model to encompass production and project
choice. Appendix 1 presents the proofs for Propositions 1 to 5. Appendix 2 presents
the systems of equations used to calculate the equilibrium in the long-run economy
in Section 4 and the equilibrium with production and multiple assets in Section 5.
It also includes robustness analysis for our numerical simulations.
2 Related Literature
Our paper is most closely related to Geanakoplos [18], which (in our language) an-
alyzed the leverage cycle in the context of an extreme BV example. Our paper is
related to a literature on collateral and credit constraints as in Bernanke, Gertler
and Gilchrist [5], Caballero and Krishnamurthy [8], Fostel and Geanakoplos [12],
Holmstrom and Tirole [26], Kiyotaki and Moore [27] and Shleifer and Vishny [29].
More closely, our paper is related to a literature on leverage as in Araujo, Kubler
and Schommer [3], Acharya and Viswanathan [1], Adrian and Shin [2], Brunnermeier
and Pedersen [7], Cao [10], Fostel and Geanakoplos [13 − 15], Geanakoplos [1719],
Gromb and Vayanos [23] and Simsek [30]. It is also related to work that studies
the asset price implications of leverage as in Hindy [24], Hindy and Huang [25] and
Garleanu and Pedersen [16].
7Some of these papers focus on investor-based leverage as in Acharya and Viswanathan
[1], Adrian and Shin [2] and Gromb and Vayanos [23], and others like Brunnermeier
and Pedersen [7], Cao [10], Fostel and Geanakoplos [12 − 15], Geanakoplos [17 − 19],
and Simsek [30] focus on asset-based leverage. Not all these models present a theory
of endogenous leverage; most of them assume a VaR=0 rule and study the cycli-
cal properties of leverage as well as its asset pricing implications. In Acharya and
Viswanathan [1] and Adrian and Shin [2] the endogeneity of leverage relies on asym-
metric information and moral hazard problems between lenders and borrowers. In
Araujo et al. [3], Cao [10], Geanakoplos [17 − 19], Fostel and Geanakoplos [13 − 15]
and Simsek [30] endogeneity does not rely on asymmetric information, rather ﬁnan-
cial contracts are micro founded by a collateralized loan market.
However, while all of these papers related low leverage with high volatility, none
of them explain or endogenize the type of bad news, but rather assume that bad
news comes with an increase in volatility. Furthermore, our paper is the ﬁrst model
to solve fully for endogenous leverage in a dynamic economy with a continuum of
agents and more than two successor states. Geanakoplos [17] showed how to make
leverage endogenous by deﬁning a contract as an ordered pair (promise, collateral)
and requiring that every contract be priced in equilibrium, even if it is not actively
traded. In Geanakoplos [17 − 19], and Fostel and Geanakoplos [13], only one contract
is traded. Araujo et al. [3], gives a two-period example of an asset which is used
as collateral in two diﬀerent actively traded contract. Finally papers like Bloom[6],
Campbell and Hentschel [9] and Chanda, Engle an Sokalska [11] provide models that
explain the negative correlation between ﬁrst and second moment. The main channel
in all these papers is risk aversion as opposed to liquidity.
3 A General Equilibrium Model of Endogenous
Leverage
We describe a simple intertemporal model with uncertainty in which agents can
use their labor to produce assets that pay dividends of the consumption good in
subsequent periods. In each period agents can buy or sell assets and the consumption
good. Most importantly, they can also use the assets as collateral to borrow the
consumption good, either for consumption or for ﬁnancing purchases of assets. The
collateral value of the assets is a crucial determinant of their equilibrium prices.
83.1 Time and Uncertainty
The model is a ﬁnite-horizon general equilibrium model, with time t =0 ,···,T.
Uncertainty is represented by a tree of date-events or states s ∈ S, including a root
s =0 . Each state s  = 0 has an immediate predecessor s∗, and each non-terminal
node s ∈ S\ST has a set S(s) of immediate successors. Each successor τ ∈ S(s)i s
reached from s via a branch σ ∈ B(s); we write τ = sσ. We denote the time of s by
the number of nodes t(s) on the path from 0 to s∗.
3.2 Utility
Suppose there is a single storable consumption good c. The von-Neumann-Morgenstern
expected utility of each investor h ∈ H is characterized by a Bernoulli utility for con-
sumption, uh, a discounting factor, δh, and subjective probabilities, qh. We assume
that the Bernoulli utility function for consumption in each state s ∈ S, uh : R+ → R,
is diﬀerentiable, concave, and monotonic. Agent h assigns subjective probability qh
s
to the transition from s∗ to s; naturally q0 = 1. Letting ¯ qh
s be the product of all qh
s 











3.3 Production of Assets and Storage
Each investor h has an endowment of the consumption good and labor, denoted by
eh
s ∈ R+ and lh
s ∈ R+ in each state s ∈ S. We assume that the consumption good







Every agent has direct access to two types of constant-returns-to-scale production
processes in the model: an inter-period and a within-period production. The inter-
period production is a simple way to model durability in the economy. A unit of
consumption warehoused in state s yields one unit of consumption in all successors
states. There is no depreciation.
The second type of production, the within-period production, transforms labor,






s + ... + zK
s ≤ lh
s}. Any investor can use his lh
s units of labor to produce any
combination of assets.
9Each asset k =1 ,...,K pays a dividend dk
s of the consumption good in each state
s. An owner of ys > 0 units of asset k in state s is entitled to the dividends dk
τys in
every immediate successor state τ of s (but not the dividends in state s).
3.4 Financial Contracts and Collateral
A ﬁnancial contract speciﬁes both a promise and the collateral backing it. Collateral
consists of durable goods, which will be called assets. The lender has the right to
seize as much of the collateral as will make him whole once the loan comes due, but
no more.
We take the consumption good as numeraire and denote the price of asset k in
each state as pk
s. We will focus on one-period non-contingent contracts. We introduce
a compact notation that speciﬁes the contract promise, the collateral, and the state
in which it is made. Contract jk
s promises j units of consumption good in each




s is the set of all contracts at state s that use as collateral one unit
of asset k. Finally, Js =

k Jk
s and J =

s∈S\ST Js.
The price of contract jk
s in state s is πjk
s . An investor can borrow πjk
s today
at s by selling contract jk
s, that is by promising j tomorrow, provided he holds a
unit of k as collateral. Since the maximum a borrower can lose is his collateral if
he does not honor his promise, the actual delivery of contract jk
s in states τ ∈ S(s)
is min{j,pk
τ + dk
τ}. If the promise j is so small that j ≤ pk
τ + dk
τ ∀τ ∈ S(s), then







The Loan-to-Value LTV jk
s associated to contract jk










s associated to contract jk
s in state s is 1 − LTV jk
s . Leverage
associated to contract jk
s in state s is the inverse of the margin, 1/mjk
s and moves
monotonically with LTV jk
s .
Sometimes the same kind of collateral k is used by one agent to back one contract,
and used by another agent to back a diﬀerent contract, each with diﬀerent LTV .W e
10deﬁne the asset k loan-to-value as the trade volume weighted average of the LTV jk
s
across all contracts actively traded in equilibrium that used asset k as collateral.3
Let ϕh
jk
s > 0 denote the quantity of sales of contract jk
s by agent h. That obliges
h to hold ϕh
jk










consumption good in state s. If ϕh
jk
s < 0, then agent h is a buyer of contract j,









τ} in each immediate successor state τ of s. When ϕh
jk
s < 0,
agent h is under no obligation to hold collateral.
3.5 Budget Set




s), each agent h ∈ H decides
what assets to produce, zs, consumption, cs, warehousing, ws, asset holdings, ys, and
contract sales (borrowing) ϕjk
s > 0, and purchases (lending), ϕjk
s < 0, in order to
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In each state s, expenditures on consumption and warehousing minus endowments
and storage, plus total expenditures on assets minus asset holdings carried over
from the last period and asset output from the within-period technology, can be at
most equal to total asset deliveries plus the money borrowed selling contracts, minus
the payments due at s from contracts sold in the previous period.4 Within-period
production is feasible. Finally, those agents who borrow must hold the required
collateral.
3For a detailed description see [12].
4We take yh
0∗ =0 .
11Let us emphasize two important things. First, notice that there is no sign con-
straint on ϕjk
s: a positive (negative) ϕjk
s indicates the agent is selling (buying) con-
tracts or borrowing (lending) πjk
s . Second, notice that we are assuming that short
selling of assets is not possible.5
3.6 Collateral Equilibrium
A Collateral Equilibrium in this economy is a set of asset prices and contract prices,
production and consumption decisions, and ﬁnancial decisions on assets and contract































4. (zh,c h,w h,yh,ϕ h) ∈ Bh(p,π),∀h
5. (z,c,w,y,ϕ) ∈ Bh(p,π) ⇒ Uh(c) ≤ Uh(ch),∀h
Markets for consumption, assets and promises clear in equilibrium and agents
optimize their utility in their budget set. As shown in Geanakoplos and Zame [21],
equilibrium in this model always exists under the assumptions we have made so far.
4 News, Asset Prices and Leverage
4.1 The baseline Economy
In this section we assume that there is only one asset. Throughout the paper we
consider assets and projects as synonyms. Suppose there are three periods, t =
0,1,2. The single asset, Y , delivers only at the ﬁnal period. We assume that state
0 has two successors U, for up, and D, for down, representing good and bad news























Figure 4: Asset payoﬀ description.
sD, at which the asset pays 1 or R<1, respectively. Thus the set of states is S ⊆
{0,U,D,UU,UD,DU,DD}. Figure 4 depicts a tree consistent with this description.
There is a continuum of heterogenous agents indexed by h ∈ H =( 0 ,1). The
only source of heterogeneity is in the subjective probabilities qh
s, that agent h believes
measures the likelihood of moving from s∗ to s, where qh
s is a continuous function of
h, for each ﬁxed s ∈ S. If state s exists in the tree, then we suppose that qh
s > 0 for






i.e., the probability of full payment after U is higher than after D.
We assume the higher the h, the more optimistic the agent is about all aspects of
the future. So, whenever h>h  , qh
U >q h 
U and, provided s has two successors, qh
sU >
5For a detailed discussion of asset prices implications of short-selling and CDS see Fostel and
Geanakoplos [15].
6If state s does not exist in the tree, then for brevity we sometimes refer to qh
s anyway, where
we mean qh
s = 0 for all h.
13qh 

























The last inequality means that the more optimistic the agent, the more likely he
thinks the payoﬀ of 1 is reached via the UU route as opposed to the DU route. We
shall refer to all these conditions as the Optimism Assumption.
Agents are risk neutral and do not discount the future. They start at t = 0 with





0 = 1 and eh
s =0 ,s  =0 , and lh
0 = 1 and lh
s =0 ,s  =0 . In this
baseline economy with one asset it is clear that in equilibrium every investor will
transform his labor into one unit of the asset at time 0.
4.2 Projects
We consider a family of projects (assets) k such that every agent h believes every
project has the same probability Qh of ultimate success (UU or DU) and probability
1−Qh of ultimate failure (UD or DD) in the last period. In the intermediate period
agents get good news U, which raises their probabilities of success to qh
UU(k) >Q h,
or they get bad news D, which lowers their probabilities of success to qh
DU(k) <









We study ﬁrst these projects individually as part of the baseline economy just
described and ask and answer: i) which of these projects k, when considered as
diﬀerent economies, has the highest equilibrium price at 0,? and ii) what are the
cyclical properties of leverage and volatility in each project?
Consider three extreme families of projects. The ﬁrst one is described in ﬁgure
5. If state U is reached in the middle period, uncertainty is completely resolved
since the asset pays for sure 1 at the end. However, if D is reached, uncertainty
remains. D is bad news, but of the sort that not only decreases the expected asset
payoﬀ compared with U but also increases ﬁnal payoﬀ volatility. This kind of project
represents the situation in which bad news induces higher future volatility. We call
it an extreme “Post-Bad News Volatility” project, or extreme BV for short.7
The second one is described in ﬁgure 6. We call this type extreme “Post-Good
News Volatility” projects, or extreme GV for short. If D is reached, all uncertainty is
resolved and the asset pays R for sure. However, if U is reached uncertainty remains.



















Figure 5: Extreme BV Project.
Extreme GV projects represent the situation in which each piece of good news, as
opposed to bad news as in the extreme BV projects, increases expected output and
also induces high future volatility.
Thirdly, consider the “two-period” project shown in Figure 7, in which U is
followed by UU for sure, and D is followed by DD for sure. These projects are
all equivalent to a two-period tree in which 0 is followed immediately by UU with
probability Qh and by DD with probability 1−Qh. Needless to say, the vast majority
of the projects fall into none of these three extreme families.
Propositions 1 and 2 show that for every baseline economy consisting of one
project, equilibrium exists and is unique and that leverage is endogenously deter-
mined in equilibrium and corresponds to the “Value at risk equal zero” rule (VaR=0).
Each buyer uses the asset as collateral to promise the value of the asset in the worst
case scenario in the next period, that is borrowing as much as possible while pre-
venting default from occurring in equilibrium. (We call this the maxmin promise).
In propositions 2 to 5 we show that: i) the initial prices of all extreme GV


















Figure 6: Extreme GV Project.
the highest initial priced project is always an extreme BV project iii) initial leverage
is higher in extreme BV projects than in extreme GV projects and iv) leverage is
pro-cyclical in extreme BV projects and counter-cyclical in all the others.
In the remainder of Section 4 we will describe in detail these results and show
numerical simulations for a ﬁxed family of probabilities. All proofs are presented in
appendix 1.
4.3 Endogenous Leverage
Proposition 1 shows that agents will never default in equilibrium, that is, they only
trade VaR=0 contracts. In fact, the proposition proves something stronger, that
only one contract is traded: the maxmin contract.
Proposition 1
Suppose that in equilibrium the max min contract j∗
s = minτ∈S(s){pτ + dτ} is
available to be traded, that is j∗














Figure 7: “Two-period” Project.






Furthermore, pU >p 0 >p D. At each state s with two successors, there is a
marginal buyer hs such that all agents h>h s buy the asset and sell j∗
s, and all
agents h<h s buy j∗
s and/or hold the consumption good. Finally, h0 >h D, if D has
two successors, and h0 >h U = hD, provided that U and D each have two successors.
Proof: See Appendix 1.
As discussed before, leverage is endogenously determined in equilibrium. In par-
ticular, the proposition derives the conclusion that although all contracts will be
priced in equilibrium, the only contract actively traded is the maxmin contract,
which corresponds to the Value at Risk equal zero rule assumed by many other
papers in the literature.
The equilibrium interest rate must be zero in each state because for simplicity
we assumed that there is no discounting and the consumption good is storable. The
17existence of a marginal buyer in each state comes from the assumption of a continuum
of traders with preferences that move continuously across traders.
Geanakoplos [18] proved a similar proposition for a special case corresponding to
the extreme BV economy. Proposition 1 is more general and encompasses all other
economies characterized by binary trees we will consider in this paper.
The key assumption in the proposition is that the tree is binary. (This implies that
the maxmin promise plus the U Arrow security, obtained by buying the asset while
selling the maxmin contract, positively spans the set of feasible portfolios payoﬀs.)
Another important ingredient in the proof is the continuum of distinct risk neutral
agents. This allows us to ﬁnd a marginal buyer who partitions the set of agents into
“optimists” who want to leverage as much as possible and “pessimists” who do not
want to compete with the optimists for any risky portfolio and who therefore end up
holding no risk at all. Another important assumption is that the asset is valued for
its dividends, not for its own sake (unlike housing).
The reader can easily check in the proof that the key to the binary assumption
is that the asset has two distinct payoﬀs in the immediate successors states of every
node. We could have derived VaR = 0 with three successors states, or even multiple
assets, provided that each asset had exactly two distinct payoﬀs in the following
period. The proof also does not depend on there being two terminal payoﬀs 1 and R.
There could just as well have been four ﬁnal payoﬀs, a diﬀerent one for each terminal
node, provided that the tree were still binary. It might be natural to assume that
the worst terminal payoﬀ after D is far worse than the worst terminal payoﬀ after U:
bad news makes a disaster possible. In that case, it is clear from V a R=0that the
maxmin promise at D would be much smaller than the maxmin promise at 0 and U,
and hence leverage would be pro-cyclical in all projects. But we shall not take this
route. We shall tie our hands and assume that there are only two possible terminal
outcomes, 1 and R, but we shall prove that leverage is nonetheless pro-cyclical in
the highest priced projects.
4.4 Equilibrium and Uniqueness
We use Proposition 1 to describe a system of equations that characterizes equilibrium.
First we deal with the case in which each s ∈{ U,D} has two successors. The system
has six equations and six unknowns: p0,p U,p D,h 0,h U,h D.
18As explained in the proof of Proposition 1, at each state s there will be a marginal
buyer, hs, who will be indiﬀerent between buying or selling Y . All agents h>h s will
buy all they can aﬀord of Y , i.e., they will sell all their endowment of the consumption
good and borrow to the maxmin using Y as collateral. On the other hand, agents
h<h s will sell all their endowment of Y and lend to the more optimistic investors.
Equating demand and supply, or equivalently, expenditures and revenues, provides
us with the ﬁrst three equations in our system.
At s = 0 aggregate revenue from sales of the asset is given by p0.8 On the other
hand, aggregate expenditure on the asset is given by (1−h0)(1+p0)+pD. The ﬁrst
term is total income (endowment plus revenues from asset sales) of buyers h ∈ [h0,1).
The second term is borrowing, which from Proposition 1 is pD. Equating we have
p0 =( 1− h0)(1 + p0)+pD (4)
Let s ∈{ U,D} have two successors sU and sD. Total revenue from asset sales
must equal total expenditure on asset purchases. This gives us
ps =( ps − pD)+( h0 − hs)(p0 +1 )+R (5)
The ﬁrst term on the RHS is the income after debt repayment of those holding the
asset from period 0. The second term is the income of the new buyers h ∈ [hs,h 0),
carried over from period 0. The last term is new borrowing.9
The next equation states that the price at s ∈{ U,D} is equal to the marginal






8All asset endowments and production add to 1 and without loss of generality are put up for
sale even by those who buy it.
9Notice that since D has two successors, pD >R .All the agents h ∈ [h0,1) will be forced to
sell oﬀ all their assets even though they think the price pD is well below the value they would be
willing to pay if they had the money. At U the original buyers h ∈ [h0,1) can only borrow R, which
is less than the pD they owe, so they will not be able to roll over all their loans without selling
some assets. Even though the traders h ∈ [h0,1) think the asset is underpriced at pU, and even
though the news is good, tightening margins force them to sell. Thus ﬁre sales can take place in
equilibrium at both U and D.I fs has just one successor then any one agent can buy all the assets
since leverage is 100%. Fire sales do not occur in that case.
19The last equation equates the marginal utility to h0 of one dollar to the marginal




































sU) for s ∈{ U,D}. If agent h0 reaches state s ∈{ U,D} with a dollar he
will want to leverage his wealth to the maxmin to purchase Y .10 This will result in



















.11 Hence the marginal utility of
a dollar at time 0 is given by the probability of reaching U times the dollar times
the marginal utility given above plus the analogous expression for reaching D. This
explains the RHS of equation (7). The LHS has exactly the same explanation once
we realize that the best action for the h0 at s ∈{ U,D} is to sell the asset and use
the cash to buy more of it on margin. This gives six equations in six unknowns.





sU) by 1 and dropping the variable hs. Furthermore, the equation in (5) and
the equation in (6) corresponding to state s, are replaced with one simple equation
ps = 1(if s = U)o rps = R (if s = D). Next we prove existence and uniqueness.
Proposition 2
Equilibrium exists and is unique in the baseline economy.
Proof: See Appendix 1.
4.5 Asset Prices and Leverage
In this section we present results that characterize prices and leverage of diﬀerent
projects.
10Agents are perfectly rational and forward looking. There are other options at s = D, like eating
the good, storing it or buying Y unleveraged, but these are all dominated strategies in equilibrium.
11Another way of understanding the same is to notice that buying Y on margin at s is equivalent
to buying the Arrow security that pays only at up (since at down the net payoﬀ is zero). The price
of this security is given by q
hs
sU, the marginal buyer’s valuation. Hence, with a dollar, h0 can buy
1/q
hs




sU), explaining the ratio.
20Proposition 3
Only extreme BV projects generate pro-cyclical leverage; all other projects (except
the trivial two-period projects) generate counter-cyclical leverage.
Proof: See Appendix 1.
The result is a direct consequence of the VaR = 0 rule. Every project is worth
the most after good news U but as long as every agent still thinks the outcome R is
possible, the minimum promise of R will be the only traded promise at U. Hence the
value ratio of promise to collateral will be least just when the price of the asset is
highest. By contrast, in an extreme BV project U has only one successor, UU, and
so the LTV at U is 100%.
Proposition 4 shows that every extreme GV project has the same price, which
is lower than the price of every other project. Finally, Proposition 5 shows that the
highest priced projects are always exclusively extreme BV projects.
Proposition 4
Every extreme GV project has the same initial price and leverage as the two-
period model, and these are lower than the initial price and leverage of every other
project.
Proof: See Appendix 1.
According to Proposition 4, the extreme GV projects have the lowest initial prices
of all. In Proposition 5 we show that some extreme BV project has the highest price
of all, including projects with four terminal nodes, provided we conﬁne our attention
to projects satisfying one more optimism assumption.
Proposition 5
Let qh
s > 0 be the probabilities in a non-extreme project in the baseline econ-
omy satisfying the optimism conditions and the additional optimism condition that
¯ qh
UD/¯ qh
DD is weakly decreasing in h.12 Then, there is another set of probabilities qBi
s
satisfying all the optimism conditions that gives rise to a corresponding extreme BV
12The extra assumption guarantees that the higher is h, the more likely an outcome of R came
from DD rather than UD.
21economy with pB
0 >p 0. It follows that among projects satisfying all the optimism
assumptions, only an extreme BV project gives the maximal initial price.
Proof: See Appendix 1.
The idea of the proof is as follows. Given an arbitrary project that is not extreme
BV, it is possible to ﬁnd an extreme BV project such that every agent’s beliefs
conditional on bad news d are the same, (so that if the marginal buyer at 0 stayed
the same, the price after bad news would also be the same, so just as much could









has risen for all i>h . This makes it more attractive for an optimist to buy the asset
at time 0 by leveraging, rather than waiting to buy the asset after news has arrived,
and thus gives the extreme BV project a higher initial price.
4.6 Numerical Simulations
In this section we present numerical simulations in order to develop more intuition
for all the previous results.
4.6.1 Three-period economy
We simulate equilibrium now in the two extreme cases of BV and GV. To ﬁx ideas,
suppose that in every project, the probability according to h of ﬁnal good output 1
is
Q










For the extreme BV economy we take qh
U = qh
DU = h, and for the extreme GV




1 − (1 − h)2.
We ﬁrst solve the system of equations described in Section 4.4 to ﬁnd the equilib-
rium in the extreme BV project. Figure 8 shows equilibrium prices, marginal buyers
and leverage for R = .2.
The ﬁrst observation is that the price of the asset falls from 0 to D, from .95 to
.69, a fall of 27%. The marginal buyer at t =0 ,h0 = .87, thinks at the beginning
that there is a probability of 1.69% of reaching the disaster state DD, but once D


























Figure 8: Extreme BV equilibrium for R = .2.
9%. So why is the crash of 27% so much bigger than the bad news of 9%? There are
three reasons for the crash.
First, as we just saw, is the presence of bad news. The second reason is that after
bad news, the leveraged investors lose all their wealth: the value of the asset at D is
exactly equal to their debt, so they go bankrupt. Therefore even the topmost buyer
at D is below the marginal buyer at 0. Third, with the arrival of bad news, leverage
goes down (margins go up), from LTV0 = .73 to LTVD = .3, so more buyers are
needed at D than at 0. Thus the marginal buyer at D is far below the marginal buyer
at 0: hD = .62 <. 87 = h0. The asset falls so far in price at D because every agent
values it less and because the marginal buyer is so much lower. This phenomenon
was called the Leverage Cycle by Geanakoplos [18] and extended further to many
assets and adverse selection by Fostel and Geanakoplos [13].
We solve next the system of equations described in section 4.4 to ﬁnd the equilib-
rium in the extreme GV project. Figure 9 shows equilibrium prices, marginal buyers
and leverage (LTV) for R = .2.




















Figure 9: Extreme GV equilibrium for R = .2.
imminent nature of the disaster once D has been reached. It goes up at U to .94.
The marginal buyer at t = 0 and t = U is the same, so optimists roll-over their debt
once they reach U.
These simulations illustrate the propositions. The original price .95 in the extreme
BV is higher than the original price .89 in the extreme GV. Moreover, leverage is
pro-cyclical in the extreme BV and counter-cyclical in the extreme GV. Finally,
leverage is higher at 0 in the extreme BV than in the extreme GV.
4.6.2 Long-run analysis
We extend our previous examples to an N horizon economy. We maintain the same
terminal probabilities for outcomes 1 and R, independent of N. By analogy with the
three period examples, each piece of good news resolves all the uncertainty in the
extreme BV project, and similarly each piece of bad news resolves all the uncertainty
in the extreme GV project. In each project we maintain constant probabilities of
U throughout the tree. The extreme BV and extreme GV projects are described
in ﬁgure 10. In the extreme BV project, as before, the imminent occurrence of the
24bad ﬁnal outcome R is pushed until the very end; thus bad news comes in small
drops, each time with an associated higher future volatility. The probability of each
piece of bad news according to any agent h is now (1 − h)2/N. On the other hand,
in the extreme GV project, good news, instead of bad news, has the property of
revealing little information and inducing high volatility. Each piece of good news
has probability (1 − (1 − h)2)1/N.
We calculate the equilibrium for each project separately. The system of equa-
tions that characterizes the equilibrium in each project and the equilibrium values
are described in detail in Appendix 2. They are the natural (though not obvious)
extension of the three period case. The prices and leverage are noted at some of the
nodes for N = 10 in ﬁgure 10.
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Figure 10: Prices and leverage for extreme BV and extreme GV projects, N =1 0
periods for R = .2.
Figure 10 shows that the results of previous sections hold even in longer horizon
economies. The price of the extreme BV project is higher than the price in the
extreme GV project and leverage is pro-cyclical in the extreme BV project and
counter-cyclical in the extreme GV project.
25It is worth remembering that the subprime crisis of 2007-2009 developed very
slowly over two and a half years. Announcements about bank losses dribbled out a
few billion dollars at a time. Over the ﬁrst year and a half most pundits maintained
that the crisis would turn out to be minor, even though mortgage security prices
and housing prices were steadily declining. It is interesting that when we extend our
model to N periods, the gap in initial price between extreme BV and extreme GV
projects gets bigger and bigger as N grows and the amount of information released
per period shrinks.
5 Does Bad News Come With High Volatility?
In this section we move on to answer a more diﬃcult question: if agents have the
opportunity to use their labor to produce any combination of the two type of projects,
extreme BV and extreme GV, which combination would they choose in equilibrium?
The question is made still more diﬃcult because we assume that news about the
projects are independent, requiring four successors of the initial node. We thus get
a good robustness check of our binary tree conclusions.
It is very tempting to jump to the conclusion that all agents will choose the
extreme BV project since it has a higher price at the beginning as shown in Section
4. Unfortunately, this answer is incorrect. Further inspection reveals that once
everyone else has chosen the extreme BV project, it becomes proﬁtable for any one
agent to produce the extreme GV project. To solve the problem we need to appeal
to the full force of the multiple asset and multiple states model described in section
3.
Suppose there are two assets, X and Y , with independent payoﬀs. Asset X
corresponds to the extreme BV project and asset Y to the extreme GV project.
Their probabilities are as deﬁned in the numerical simulations in Section 4.6. The
joint tree of payoﬀs is described in ﬁgure 11. Note that state s = 0 now has four
successors. For example, the state (U,U) in the intermediate period corresponds to
the situation in which X (BV) and Y (GV) receive good news. The probability of
such event for agent h is h

1 − (1 − h)2.
Agents are as in the baseline economy in section 4. They can transform their unit




















Figure 11: Joint extreme BV and extreme GV economy. Equilibrium prices for
R = .2.
is given by Zh
0 = {(zX
0 ,zY
0 ) ∈ R2
+ : zX
0 + zY
0 =1 }, where zX
0 is the share of X (BV
project) and zY
0 the share of Y (GV project).
Figure 11 shows the equilibrium prices at each node for both assets, extreme
BV and extreme GV, respectively for R = .2. At equilibrium, all agents choose to
produce the same mix zX
0 = .7 and zY
0 = .3. But how did we ﬁnd equilibrium?
5.1 Endogenous Leverage
Before moving on to solve the model, let us go back to the question of endoge-
nous leverage. By Proposition 1, VaR = 0 holds for the intermediate states s ∈
{UU,UD,DU,DD}, since for each asset there are at most two distinct successor
payoﬀ values. Hence, the only contract traded in all intermediate states is the one
that prevents default in equilibrium as in Section 4.
However, the situation is diﬀerent at time 0 since there are four successor states
27in S(0) with three distinct successor payoﬀ values for each asset,13 and therefore it
is not possible to appeal to the result anymore. In fact, as we show next, for each
asset two types of contracts will be traded in equilibrium: one that promises the
worst-case scenario and another that promises the middle-case scenario. While the
ﬁrst one is risk-less as before, the second one is not since it defaults in the worst
state. In this model, not only is there default in equilibrium, but also the same asset
is traded simultaneously with diﬀerent margin requirements by diﬀerent investors.
Araujo et al.[3] and Fostel and Geanakoplos [14] displayed the same phenomenon in
a two-period model. In the following section we show for the ﬁrst time that multiple
margins can emerge in equilibrium in a multi-period, dynamic setting. The dynamic
setting is more diﬃcult because the payoﬀs of the risky bonds issued at date 0 depend
on the endogenous asset prices in the intermediate period.
5.2 Procedure to ﬁnd the equilibrium
This section describes in detail the procedure to compute the equilibrium. The
reader can skip this subsection and go directly to the next sections in which we




0 . Then using the fact that the two asset prices at the beginning
must be equal in a genuine equilibrium,14 we ﬁnd the zX
0 that precisely accomplishes
that.15
Given price expectations, buying an asset on margin using a ﬁnancial contract
deﬁnes a down-payment at time 0 and a proﬁle of net payoﬀs in the future. In this
sense, we can think of nine diﬀerent securities at time 0, six risky and three risk-less:
i) buying X on margin using the risky bond (the one that promises pX
DU), ii) buying
X on margin using the risk-less bond (which promises the smaller amount pX
DD), iii)
buying Y on margin using the risky bond (the one that promises pY
DU), iv) buying
Y on margin using the risk-less bond (which promises the smaller amount pY
DD), v)
the risky bond that promises pX
DU, vi) the risky bond that promises pY
DU, vii) the
risk-less bond that promises pX
DD, viii) the risk-less bond that promises pY
DD and ix)
warehousing.
13X’s price is 1 at UU and UD and Y ’s price is R at UD and DD.
14In general equilibrium all assets are put to sale ﬁrst, if one asset had a higher price, investors
would invest all of their labor into that asset, sell it and buy the other.
15Hopefully if we start with a good guess of zX
0 near the true value we will be able to shift zX
0
until prices are equal without changing the equilibrium regime by continuity.
28In equilibrium the risk-less interest rate will be zero, as before, hence all the risk-
less bonds will be priced equal to their respective promise. In addition to zX
0 and zY
0
we need to ﬁnd the value of 20 variables:







• Risky bond prices at s =0 :πX,πY, where πk is the price of the bond that
promises pk
DU in all successors states in the future.











corresponds to the marginal buyer of the k asset leveraging with the risky
(risk-less) bond at s =0 .
• Risky bond marginal buyers: hBX,h BY at s =0 .
• Asset purchases at s = 0 leveraging with the risky bond: yX,yY.
Following the same idea as in Section 4, we guess a regime, consisting of a ranking
of the securities. Then for every consecutive pair of securities, we ﬁnd a marginal
buyer that is indiﬀerent between the two. This deﬁnes a system of equations. Once
we get a solution we need to check: ﬁrst, that pX
DU >p X
DD, so that prices are consistent
with our guess about which bonds are risky and risk-less on X, second, that pY
UU >
pY
DU, so that prices are consistent with our guess about which bonds are risky and
risk-less on Y , and ﬁnally, that each regime is genuine, i.e. all the marginal agents
strictly prefer their pair of securities to all the others, and all agents in between
consecutive marginal agents strictly prefer just one security.
We now describe the regimes at each node. Figure 12 shows a graphical illustra-
tion of them and of the equilibrium values of all marginal buyers.




m >h BY >h BX. All
h>h Y
M buy Y , sell X and promise pY
DU. hY
M >h>h X




m buy X, sell Y and promise pX
DD. hX
m >h>h Y
m buy Y , sell X and
promise R. hY
m >h>h BY sell both assets and buy the BY bond (lend in the risky
market collateralized by Y ). hBY >h>h BX sell all assets and buy the BX bond
(lend in the risky market collateralized by X). Finally, h<h BX sell everything, hold
risk-less securities (so lend in the risk-less markets).
16Notice that some prices are obvious, X’s price equals 1 for sure at UU and UD, whereas Y ’s
price is R at UD and DD. It is also clear that at UD all uncertainty is resolved and there is no
more trade.













































Figure 12: Equilibrium regimes for R = .2.




m. As before, all h>h Y
UU buy Y and promise R. Below lend and buy
X.
At s = DU, there is trade in both assets, and the marginal buyers are such that
hBY >h X
DU >h Y
DU >h BX.h>h X
M go bankrupt since they promise exactly what
they own. h>h X
DU buy X and promise R. hX
DU >h>h Y
DU buy Y and promise R.
All h<h Y
DU lend.
At s = DD there is only trade on asset X and the marginal buyer is such that
hBY >h X
DD >h BX. All h>h Y
m are out of business either because they default or
they have no money left. h>h X
DD buy X and promise R. h<h X
DD lend.
We calculate the equilibrium values and ﬁnally check the assumed regime is a
genuine equilibrium. The system of equations used to solved for the equilibrium is
presented in Appendix 2.
305.3 Agents Prefer the Extreme BV Project
All equilibrium values listed in ﬁgures 11 and 12 are consistent with the assumed
regimes and prices as discussed in Appendix 2. The most important thing to observe
is that zX
0 = .7, this is, all agents choose to invest their labor in a portfolio with a
70% share of the extreme BV project. Or equivalently, 70% of the economy invests
in extreme BV projects when given the opportunity to choose. The consequence of
this is that, since we assumed that the two projects were independent, 70% of the
time when bad news occurs they will be of the volatile type, and we will observe
pro-cyclical leverage. This result that at least 70% of the projects are BV is robust
to any choice of the parameter R as discussed in Appendix 2.
5.4 Endogenous Leverage Reconsidered
When the asset could take on at most two immediate successor values, equilibrium
determines a unique actively traded promise (namely the maxmin) and hence lever-
age. With three or more successor values, we cannot expect a simple promise. But
equilibrium still determines the average leverage used to buy each asset.
Equilibrium leverage is presented in table 1. There are eight securities in total,
six risky securities and two risk-less securities (without considering warehousing).
Columns 2 and 3 show the holdings and value of such holdings for each of the
securities. Most importantly, column 4 shows the LTV of each of the four traded
contracts. As was expected, LTV is higher for the risky contracts (they have a higher
promise) for both assets. Finally, column 5 shows the LTV for each asset. Whereas
the LTV for BV is .76, it is only .6 for GV. As deﬁned in Section 2, asset LTV is a
weighted average. For example the LTV for BV is obtained from the total amount
.423+.091 borrowed using all contracts backed by the BV, divided by the total value
of BV collateral, .966 × .695.
As in Section 4, BV is leveraged more on average than the GV. Second, also
as before, leverage in BV is pro-cyclical while it is counter-cyclical in GV. Third,
notice that even though both projects have the same initial price in equilibrium, for
both assets the price is higher than in Section 3 (.966 versus .95 for BV and .89
for GV). The main reason for this diﬀerence is that now with a diﬀerent tree, more
contracts are traded in equilibrium, not only the risk-less one. Both assets can be
leveraged more now using risky contracts which promise more (and hence default
31as well). Whereas there is not so much diﬀerence between the minimum promise
and the medium promise for BV (.691 and .754) this diﬀerence is signiﬁcant for GV
(.2 and .936). For a precise discussion of the connection between leverage and asset
prices see Fostel and Geanakoplos [14] and [15].
Table 1: Equilibrium Contract and Asset Leverage for R = .2.
   Leverage at s=0          
                 
Security  Holdings  Holdings Value  Contract LTV  Asset  Asset LTV 
                 
                 
Y lev Medium  0.186 0.180  0.947  X (GV)  0.766 
X lev Medium  0.563 0.544  0.778        
X lev Min  0.132 0.128  0.715  Y (BV)  0.660 
Y lev Min  0.119 0.115  0.207        
Y risky bond  0.186 0.171           
X risky bond  0.563 0.423           
Y riskless bond  0.119 0.024           
X riskless bond  0.132 0.091           
                  
                 
                 
   Leverage at intermediate nodes       
                 
    UU UD  DU  DD    
                  
X (BV)  1.000 1.000  0.267  0.290     
                   
Y (GV)  0.202 1.000  0.215  1.000     
                 
So, why did agents choose extreme BV more? The simple reason is that BV
can be leveraged more at the beginning. So the most optimistic agents will choose
extreme BV. However, as soon as less optimistic people opt for volatile bad news
projects, its price will start to decline and the extreme GV project will start to
become attractive to other investors. This process will continue until prices are
equal in equilibrium.
Our main result also suggests an explanation for the observed “Volatility Smile”
in stock options. This refers to the fact that implied volatility has a negative re-
lationship with the strike price, so volatility decreases as the strike price increases.
Hence, bad news comes (or are assumed to come) with high volatility. The pat-
tern has existed for equities only after the stock market crash of 1987. This has
led some economist like Bates [4] and Rubinstein [28] to explain volatilities smiles
by “crashophobia”. Traders are concerned about the possibility of another crash
and they price options accordingly. Our result provides a completely diﬀerent ex-
planation. Our agents are perfectly rational, they endogenously choose projects
32associated with volatile bad news since they can leverage more with them. For 70%
of the projects in our economy, their volatility goes up after their price falls.
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Appendix 1: Proofs of Propositions.
Proof of Proposition 1:
Without loss of generality we only consider contracts in state s with j ≤ maxτ∈S(s){pτ+
dτ} since bigger promises are equivalent.
1. All riskless rates are non-positive. If 0 <j≤ j∗
s then πj
s ≥ j.
Consider ﬁrst the state s =0 , where we know the endowment of consumption
good is non-zero. Somebody has to hold a positive amount of the consumption
good at the end of period s = 0, either to consume or to inventory. But if
πj
s <jthey would have done better investing  πj
s in contract j and receiving
 j in the next period giving them a higher utility since there is no discounting,
a contradiction. Consider now state s = U and suppose πj
s <j .No agent
would consume his consumption good at s = 0, because he could do better
inventorying it into states U and D, eating if in D and buying contract j in
35state U, and then consuming even more at UU and UD. Hence agents would
enter state U with consumption good, but that leads to a contradiction as
before. The same argument applies to s = D.
2. Observable riskless rates are zero. If 0 <j≤ j∗
s is traded in equilibrium, then
πj





Nobody would buy j if πj
s >j , since he could do better by inventorying, so
πj
s = j. The seller of j could have sold
j
j∗
s units of j∗
s instead (and used less















3. If j with psU + dsU ≥ j>j ∗









s and bs =1 −as, then πj
s = asj+bsj∗
s. (The analogous conclusion
would hold if psD + dsD >j>j ∗
s.)
Contract j pays fully in the up state, but defaults and pays only j∗
s = psD+dsD
in the down state. The seller of the contract must have put up the collateral
of one unit of the asset, and therefore is eﬀectively buying an Arrow security




psU + dsU − j
The seller of contract j could instead have acquired U Arrow securities by
buying the asset while borrowing π
j∗
s

























The buyer of contract j could have instead inventoried j∗
s consumption goods
and bought (j − j∗
s) U Arrow securities via the risky promise as above, hence























36It follows that all the previous inequalities must be equalities, otherwise we
would have17
(j − j∗





























s, any agent who ends up holding some of the asset would be foolish
not to borrow. At worst the agent uses   units of the asset as collateral to
sell ε units of contract j∗
s, then inventories επ
j∗
s
s and pays back εj∗
s, getting






5. If s ∈{ U,D} has two successors, then any portfolio that any agent h would





s , and bs =1− as.
Any feasible portfolio payoﬀ (csU,c sD) requires csU ≥ csD. The cheapest way
to buy those payoﬀs is to inventory csD units of the consumption good and
to buy csU − csD units of the U Arrow security via the purchase of the asset
borrowing using contract j∗
s.
6. If s ∈{ U,D} has two successors, then the only contract traded is the maxmin
contract j∗
s. Moreover, deﬁning the “marginal buyer” as the unique hs such
that q
hs
sU = as, all agents h>h s simply buy the asset and sell j∗
s, and all agents
h<h s simply inventory the consumption good and/or buy j∗
s.






























it is evident that agents h ∈ Hs will only buy the U Arrow securities and agents
i ∈ Is will only hold portfolios with payoﬀs csU = csD. In particular, none of
them will buy the contracts j that involve default in the bad state. Since by









bs, we conclude that there is no default (up to measure zero)
in equilibrium, conﬁrming the VaR=0 rule. It follows that no agent i ∈ Is
will hold any of the asset. Hence, no i ∈ Is = {h ∈ [0,1] : h<h s} would
be able to sell any contracts. All the asset will be held by agents h ∈ Hs =
{h ∈ [0,1] : h>h s}, but since they only want to hold the U Arrow security,
they must all be buying the asset via selling the maxmin contract. In short, the
maxmin contract is the only contract sold in equilibrium. Note that for h ∈ Hs,
μh
s = qh
sU/as and for i ∈ Is,μ i
s = qi
sU + qi
sD = 1 In short, μh
s = max{1,qh
sU/as}.
7. pU >p D.
If U has just one successor, then pU =1>p D. If D has just one successor,
then pU >R= pD. Suppose both s ∈{ U,D} have two successors. By step 6
only agents in Is =[ 0 ,h s) consume in state sD, which they do by saving all





the optimism assumption, we would need hD >h U. Furthermore, every agent
h ∈ [0,1] would have at least as much wealth at s = D as he does at s = U. But
that would be a contradiction, since the total supply of consumption goods is
the same 1 + R at UD and DD.
8. Any portfolio that any agent h would want to hold at state 0 delivers (cU,c D),




0 and b0 =1− a0. The
only contract traded is the maxmin contract j∗
0. Moreover, there is a “marginal
buyer” h0 who is indiﬀerent between buying the asset or holding money at state
0. All agents h>h 0 simply buy the asset and sell j∗
0, and all agents h<h 0
simply buy j∗
0 and/or hold the consumption good.
Because pU >p D, the description of equilibrium in period s = 0 is completely




s . The identical proof goes through provided that we can show that the
utility agent h gets from the cash ﬂows cU >c D is continuous and strictly

















































which is increasing in h since qh
0U and qh
UU are increasing, and qh
0D is decreasing





which is deﬁnitely increasing.
9. Furthermore, pU >p 0 >p D. If D has two successors, then h0 >h D, and if both
U and D have two successors, then h0 >h U = hD. If U has two successors and
D has one successor, then h0 = hU.
The marginal buyer h0 must be indiﬀerent between the asset and the con-
sumption good. Since p0 invested in the consumption good yields p0 in both
states U and D, we must have pU >p 0 >p D. Since all the buyers h ∈ (h0,1)
borrow pD ≥ R at 0, they each owe pD ≥ R at U and D. If D has two suc-
cessors, then pD >Rand the most any agent can borrow at D is R. Hence all
the agents h ∈ (h0,1) go completely bankrupt at D and the marginal buyer
hD <h 0. If in adddition U has two successors, then the most that can be
borrowed at U is also R. Hence again the agents h ∈ (h0,1) are forced to sell
some of their assets, and the marginal buyer hU <h 0. But then every agent
h ∈ (0,h 0) ⊃ [(0,h U) ∪ (0,h D)] has the same wealth 1 + p0 at U and at D. In
order for consumption demand to equal consumption supply at UD and DD,
39we must then have hU = hD =( 1+R)/(1 + p0). If U has two successors and
D has one successor, then hD = R and the agents h ∈ (h0,1) can just roll over
their loans at U and keep their assets, so h0 = hU =( 1+R)/(1 + p0).
Proof of Proposition 2:
Consider ﬁrst the system of six equations, when each state s ∈{ U,D} has two
successors. We shall now reduce the six equilibrium conditions into one equation
F(h)=0 . We proceed to deﬁne F. In accordance with step 9 of proposition 1,
let hU = hD = h. For h ∈ [0,1] let p0(h)=1+R
h − 1. Thus we already know












1+R h. If p0(h) >p D(h), then pD(h) is increasing in h.


























We will show that at any point h ∈ [0,1] where F(h)=0 ,F is increasing in
h. Note ﬁrst that as h increases, p0(h) decreases, and this causes F to increase.
Next, note from the preceding paragraph that at any h ∈ [0,1],p U(h) >p D(h).
Hence at F(h)=0 ,pU(h)/p0(h) > 1 >p D(h)/p0(h). Hence, h0(h) increases when h



































. This is increasing in h because R
p0(h) < 1. Exactly the same argument














in h. Thus we have shown that indeed F(h) is increasing in h in a neighborhood of
F(h) = 0. This and the continuity of F proves that there is at most a unique h with
F(h)=0 , and hence that equations (4)-(7) have at most one solution.
Notice that as h → 0,p 0(h) →∞ , so F(h) must become negative. But when
h =1 ,p 0(h)=R = pD(h) <p U(h), so F(1) > 0. Since F is continuous, there must
be an h ∈ [0,1] with F(h) = 0. This completes the proof in the case where each
s ∈{ U,D} has two successors. If exactly one s ∈{ U,D} has two successors, the
proof can be handled almost the same way.
If both U and D have a single successor, then the proof is modiﬁed by deﬁning the




p0(h0) −1. Raising h0 near where F(h0) = 0 lowers p0(h0)
40and raises Qh0, both of which increase F. Hence for the reasons above F(h0) = 0 has
a unique solution.
Proof of Proposition 3:
By proposition 1, buying 1 unit of Y on margin at state s means: selling a promise
of minτ∈S(s)[pτ +dτ] using that unit of Y as collateral, and paying (ps−minτ∈S(s)[pτ +
dτ]) in cash. The Loan to Value (LTV) of Y at s is, LTVs =
minτ∈S(s)[pτ+dτ]
ps . If
s ∈{ U,D} has only one successor sU, then s must be good news and so s = U.
Moreover, every agent will agree on qh
sU = qh
UU = 1 and so in equilibrium we must
have pU = dUU = 1 and therefore LTVU =1 /1 = 100%. If we are not in the trivial
two-period model, there will still be uncertainty remaining at s = D, i.e. s = D
has two successors, so R<p D < 1 and hence LTVD = R/pD < 100% = LTVU.
Hence, leverage is pro-cyclical. In the other extreme case, if s ∈{ U,D} has only
one successor sD, then s = D, qh
sD = qh
DD =1 ,pD = dDD = R and therefore
LTVU = R/R = 100%. Since there will still be uncertainty remaining at s = U, i.e.
s = U has two successors, then R<p U < 1 and hence LTVU = R/pU < 100% =
LTVD. Hence leverage is counter-cyclical. Every project in which both U and D
have two successors gives rise to counter-cyclical leverage because pU >p D and hence
LTVU = R/pU <R / p D = LTVD. 
Proof of Proposition 4:
From the proof of proposition 1 it is evident that the initial price p0 is the same
as in the trivial two-period project. As we saw in the proof of proposition 2, in the
trivial two-period model p0(h0)=1+R
h0 − 1=Qh01+( 1− Qh0)R.
Consider now any other project in which at least one s ∈{ U,D} has two suc-
cessors and a marginal buyer ¯ h. We know from proposition 1 that the initial price
p0(¯ h)=1+R
¯ h − 1 >Q
¯ h1+( 1− Q
¯ h)R. The ﬁrst equality is the familiar equality
derived in step 9 of proposition 1. The strict inequality holds because by proposi-
tion 1 the marginal utility to ¯ h of holding the consumption good at 0 is 1 (since





D = 1) and because ¯ h strictly prefers not to buy Y at 0. Thus if ¯ h<h 0,
then p0(¯ h)=1+R
¯ h − 1 > 1+R
h0 − 1=p0(h0). But by the optimism assumption, if
¯ h ≥ h0, then p0(¯ h) >Q
¯ h1+( 1− Q
¯ h)R ≥ Qh01+( 1− Qh0)R = p0(h0). Either way,
p0(¯ h) >p 0(h0).
We now turn to initial leverage, which is R
p0 in the two-period model (and in
any extreme GV project) and
¯ pD
¯ p0 in the other project. Suppose R
p0 ≥
¯ pD
¯ p0 . Then
41the down-payment would be strictly less in the two-period project, while the payoﬀ
1 − R>1 − ¯ pD would be strictly more. Hence in order for the marginal buyer in
each economy to be indiﬀerent between the project and money, h0 < ¯ h0. But that








¯ p0 = ¯ h0.
Proof of Proposition 5:
We will make use of the following lemma.
Lemma:
Let qh
s(0) > 0 be probabilities for an extreme BV. Let t :[ 0 ,1] → (0,1) be a
continuous, weakly declining function of h. Deﬁne probabilities qh
s(t) ≡ qh



























DD(0) − th¯ q
h
DD(0)
obtained by moving th of agent h’s probability from DU and DD to UU and DU,
respectively. Then the qh
s(t) also satisfy the continuity and optimism assumptions.
Moreover the unique equilibrium initial price p0(0) of the original extreme BV econ-
omy is greater than the unique equilibrium price p0(t).
Proof of lemma:
Notice that for all h, ¯ qh
UU(t)+¯ qh
DU(t)=¯ qh
UU(0) + ¯ qh




UD(0) + ¯ qh
























DU(0). Fix the marginal buyer h at D at the equilibrium
level for the original extreme BV economy qh
s(0). Following the proof of proposition








DD(0). Hence h0 is a function of




























































DU (t)) = Qh0(h) is independent of t, and since (1 − R
p0(h)) > 0,























DU(0) . Moreover, ¯ qh















Thus we have shown F(h,t) < 0. Hence as in the proof of proposition 2, there must
be h(t) >hwith F(h(t),t)=0 . But then by the familiar formula for the initial price
given in (9) of proposition 1 and in proposition 2, p0(h(t)) <p 0(h). This concludes
the proof of the lemma.
To prove proposition 5, notice that given any non-extreme project qh
s, we can ﬁnd
















DD(0)) so that the original
project corresponds to project t in the lemma. 
Appendix 2
Equations for Long Run Extreme BV Projects
Notice that since the ﬁnal probability of disaster is constant (regardless of N), the
probability of bad news in period k is given by (1 − hk)2/N.
• pN+1 = R























Tables 2 presents the equilibrium values.
43Table 2: BV equilibrium N=10, R=.2.
                    
                   





                  
0 0.9914 0.9875     0.9827     
1 0.9768 0.9704  1.0000  0.9702  1.0000 
2 0.9547 0.9415  1.0000  0.9534  1.0000 
3 0.9244 0.8976  1.0000  0.9327  1.0000 
4 0.8856 0.8372  1.0000  0.9081  1.0000 
5 0.8394 0.7603  1.0000  0.8791  1.0000 
6 0.7870 0.6684  1.0000  0.8441  1.0000 
7 0.7301 0.5642  1.0000  0.7995  1.0000 
8 0.6718 0.4511  1.0000  0.7431  1.0000 
9 0.6038 0.3352  1.0000  0.5967  1.0000 
10    0.2000 1.0000          
                  
                  
Equations for Long Run Extreme GV Projects
We use the fact that the marginal buyer rollover his debt at every node to build up
the system and then verify that the guess is correct. Notice that the probability of
good news in period k is given by (1 − (1 − hk)2)1/N.





• pk = ((1 − (1 − hk)2)1/N)N−k +( 1− ((1 − (1 − hk)2)1/N)N−k)R
Tables 3 presents the equilibrium values.
System of Equations in Section 5
The system of equations is conceptually an extension of the system in Section 4. In
every state supply equals demand for all the securities. Also marginal buyers are
determined by an indiﬀerence condition between investing in two diﬀerent securities.
44Table 3: GV equilibrium N=10, R=.2.
                    
                   





                  
0 0.6340  0.8928     0.2240     
1 0.6340  0.9112  0.2000  0.2195  1.0000 
2 0.6340  0.9205  0.2000  0.2173  1.0000 
3 0.6340  0.9300  0.2000  0.2151  1.0000 
4 0.6340  0.9396  0.2000  0.2129  1.0000 
5 0.6340  0.9494  0.2000  0.2107  1.0000 
6 0.6340  0.9592  0.2000  0.2085  1.0000 
7 0.6340  0.9692  0.2000  0.2064  1.0000 
8 0.6340  0.9793  0.2000  0.2042  1.0000 
9 0.6340  0.9896  0.2000  0.2021    1.0000 
10    1.0000  0.2000          
                  
                  
As before, all marginal utility of a dollar invested in any security is weighted by
the marginal utility of future actions in each state. Equations (a)-(l) corresponds to
state s = 0. Equations (m)-(n) to state s = UU. Equations (o)-(r) to state s = DU
and the rest to state s = DD.
Notation: qh





































4. ((1 − α)hY





































































































































































































































































































































































46All the values listed in ﬁgures 8 and 9 are consistent with the assumed regimes
and prices as discussed in section 4.2. It turns out also that this equilibrium is
genuine in the sense that all agents’ decisions are optimal. The risky bond prices
at date 0 are πX = .7521 on a promise of .7548, corresponding to an interest rate
of .36% and πY = .9156 on a promise of .9366, corresponding to an interest rate of
2.3%. The most leveraged asset purchases at date 0 are yX = .520 and yY = .184.
The veriﬁcation that each agent is indeed maximizing is available upon request.
Robustness Analysis.
Table 3 presents the proportion invested in the extreme BV project (α) and leverage
for each project at s = 0 for a grid of values of R, the key parameter in our sim-
ulations. We can see that the two properties, that α>. 5 (so that investors invest
mostly in the BV technology) and that initial leverage higher in extreme BV than
in extreme GV, are valid for values of R other than .2 considered in the main text.
The grid presents values up to R = .6. For values larger than R = .7 the equilibrium
regime discussed in section 5.2 is not genuine anymore. Two contracts are still traded
for the extreme BV project, but only the riskless contract is traded for the extreme
GV project. It is obvious that for higher values of R, the extreme BV project will
be leveraged even more and hence our result is clearly true.
Table 4: Robustness Section 4.
R α  price    LTVBV LTVGV 
              
              
0.2 0.6950  0.9664  0.7662  0.6596 
               
0.3 0.7120  0.9800  0.8135  0.5968 
               
0.4 0.7280  0.9891  0.8582  0.5691 
               
0.5 0.7450  0.9947  0.8978  0.5984 
               
0.6 0.7600  0.9978  0.9323  0.6429 
               
47